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Extent

1 digital object.

Cite This Work

Driscoll, Jesse (2016). Data from: Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building. UC San Diego Library Digital Collections. https://doi.org/10.6075/J0KS6PHX

Description

PAPER ABSTRACT: After highly fragmented civil wars, order is often secured through the selective co-optation of rebel field commanders and atomized insurgents. This paper presents a formal model of civil war settlement as a coalition formation game between various regime and rebel factions. This approach emphasizes the ability of installed civilian rulers to lure warlords into the state based on promises of future wealth, then use divide-and-rule tactics to pit different warlord factions against one another. Quantitative and qualitative data from Tajikistan, including an original data set of warlord incorporation and regime purges during wartime reconstruction, are used to evaluate the model.

Creation Date

• 2012

Date Issued

• 2016

Researcher

• Driscoll, Jesse

Geographic

• Central Asia

Topics

• Civil war
• Coalitions
• Game theory
• State-building

Formats

View formats within this collection

• data
• text

Language

• No linguistic content; Not applicable

Related Resource

Primary associated publication

• Driscoll, Jesse. 2012. Commitment problems or bidding wars? Rebel fragmentation as peace-building. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 1, 118-149. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711429696